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Summary. Access controls ensure that all direct accesses to objects are authorized
by means of user identification. However, in some scenarios it is also necessary to
continuously check the identity of the user in order to avoid malicious behaviors
such as person exchanges immediately after the initial authentication phase.
Aim of this work is to propose a methodology based on a balanced mix of strong
and weak authentication techniques studied to guarantee a high and prolonged in
time level of security combining the advantages of each authenticator.
1.1 Introduction
Access controls ensure that all direct accesses to objects are authorized. By
regulating the reading, changing, and deletion of data and programs, access
controls protect against accidental and malicious threats to secrecy, authen-
ticity, and system availability. The effectiveness of access controls rests on one
important premise, the proper user identification [UPPJ04]: no one should
be able to acquire the access rights of another. Traditionally, access control
relies on profile information associated to users and resources in a given do-
main. However, in some scenarios it is also necessary to continuously check
the identity of the user in order to avoid malicious behaviors such as person
exchanges immediately after the authentication phase used for accessing the
system. An example can be a system for university course examinations from
remotely connected pc stations: in this situation we can be interested in being
sure that the authenticated student is not substituted by another person just
after the initial identification process, but she is the one that compiles the
entire course test.
Aim of this work is to propose a methodology based on a balanced mix of
strong and weak authentication techniques studied to guarantee a high and
prolonged in time level of security avoiding the excessive cost of using only
biometric devices.
For this reason, remote access is initially provided by means of biomet-
ric devices but then it is granted in time by means of other authentication
methods. In such a scenario, the system must distinguish between the initial
authentication phase, in which it recognizes the user profile and allows the
access, and the following authentication steps in which the system decides
if its trust in user’s identity is enough high to allow the user to continue to
perform the activity she is doing. Focus of this paper is not the semantics
used to describe the users profile, but the description of the fuzzy logic based
methodology used by a system to continuously check and confirm its trust in
the identity of a user.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 presents a brief
overview of the authentication devices used to ensure the identity of a user
and compares advantages and drawbacks of the different techniques, Section
1.3 describes the general architecture of the fuzzy methodology used to en-
sure the user identity during time, Section 1.4 presents the fuzzy rules used
by the methodology engines to compute the user identity trust level during
time and, finally, Section 1.5 reviews the conclusions of this work and propose
some future work and open issues.
1.2 User authentication systems and their trustfulness
User authentication is the process of positively verifying the identity of an
user, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system. User
authentication is then essential for reliable access control and rights manage-
ment systems determine a user authorization to access the content [UPPJ04].
1.2.1 Traditional systems
Traditional cryptosystems do not identify the user as such. The authentica-
tion is knowledge-based, answering the question: ‘What you know’ such as a
password, or token-based, answering the question: ‘What you have’ such as a
key, magnetic or chip card.
A password includes single words, phrases, and personal identification
numbers (PINs) that are closely kept secrets used for authentication. The
basic problem with this technique is that a memorable password can often be
guessed or searched by an attacker and a long, random, changing password is
difficult to remember. As result they are stored and released on some alter-
native authentication mechanism and they can be shared with other users.
An identity or security token is a physical device that can contain pass-
words, such as a bankcard, or smartcard, that includes tamper-resistant pack-
aging and special hardware that disables the token if it is tampered with or if
the number of failed authentication attempts exceeds a chosen threshold. The
main problem is that these devices can be lost, stolen, forgotten or disclosed.
Strong authentication methods are usually developed to solve the draw-
backs the traditional techniques. Biometric systems implement human authen-
tication and identification in rights management systems. They are defined as
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ID-based authenticators, answering the question: ‘Who you are’. They are
characterized by the uniqueness to one person. The main security defense is
that they are difficult to copy or forge.
1.2.2 Biometric systems
Biometrics are automated methods of authentication based on measurable hu-
man physiological or behavioral characteristics. Common physical biometrics
include fingerprints, hand or palm geometry and retina, iris or facial character-
istics. Behavioral features include signature, voice (which has also a physical
component), keystroke pattern and gait.
Biometric technologies most commonly implemented are based on:
• Fingerprint, based on matching numeric information of finger minutie. It
is easy, fast of use and low cost and it has considered the higher authen-
tication form from the people.
• Hand Geometry, which involves analyzing and measuring the shape of
the hand. It offers a good balance of performance characteristics and is
relatively easy of use, the accuracy can be very high.
• Iris, which analyzes features found in the iris, uses a fairly conventional
camera element and requires no close contact between the user and the
reader. It has the potential for higher than average template-matching
performance, even though easy of use and system integration have not
traditionally been strong points with iris scanning devices.
• Face, which analyzes facial characteristics. It requires a digital camera to
develop a facial image of the user for authentication.
• Voice, which is not based on voice recognition, but on voice-to-print au-
thentication, where complex technology transforms voice into text.
• Signature, which analyzes the way a user signs her name. Signing features
such as speed and pressure are as important as the finished signature’s
static shape.
These methods are inherently more reliable than password-based authentica-
tion, as biometric features cannot be borrowed, stolen or forgotten; further-
more they are extremely difficult to copy, share and distribute. The main
issue in biometric authentication system is performance, defined considering
different factors, depending on critical issues in the data acquisition phase.
A comparison between different techniques is in [LS01] and briefly reported
in Table 1.1
Once enrolled in a biometric system, a user can be successfully authenti-
cated. The overall process, presented in detail in [UPPJ04, VZ03], is the same
for each different biometric approach, and it is represented with a first enroll-
ment phase and a second matching phase. The result is typically explained in
terms of a matching score; the higher the matching score, the better compar-
ison result is obtained.
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Table 1.1. Biometric Comparison.
Characteristics Fingerprint Hand Geometry Iris Face Voice Signature
Ease of use High High Medium Medium High High
Accuracy High High Very High Very High High High
Use acceptance Medium Medium Medium-low Medium Very high High
Required security level High Medium Very high Medium Medium Medium
Long term stability High Medium High Medium Medium Medium
In a such identification system, acceptance is determined considering two
types of biometric errors:
• FAR - False Acceptance Rate - that defines the percentage of impostors
incorrectly matched to a valid user’s biometric.
• FRR - False Rejection Rate - that defines the percentage of incorrectly
rejected valid users.
There is a trade off between FAR and FRR in every biometric system, since
they are functions of the system threshold t: if t is decreased to make the
system more tolerant to input variations and noise, FAR increases. For each
biometric technology these rates are calculated by experimental tests. Phe-
notypic features do not set limits on the FAR, but clearly, over time the
phenotypic variation imposes a lower limit on the FRR.
1.2.3 Critical Issue
Some systems incorrectly assume that biometric measurements are secret and
grant access to any user presenting matching measurements. On the other
hand, as sensitive data, biometrics should be properly protected, but they
cannot be considered secret. The only way to secure a biometrics system
is to ensure that the characteristics presented come from a real person and
they are obtained and authenticated during verification from the person. For
this reason it should be defined a liveness test, in which, before granting
a user access, a system must make sure that the authentication device is
verifying a living person; this tests are usually performed by the core biometric
technology.
Another critical aspect is that a biometric system must believe that the
biometric measurements presented come from a trusted input device and they
have been captured at a certain time. If authentication is performed on-device,
the device should be trust-worthy; otherwise, if it is performed off-device,
the software operating environment and the communication link between the
software and the device must be secure.
1.2.4 Advantages and Shortcomings
Biometric characteristics are essentially permanent and unchangeable and
users cannot pass them to other users as easily as they do with cards or
4
passwords. Furthermore these techniques are based on features that cannot
be lost or forgotten. A biometric authentication systems is also fast. The au-
thentication of an user in a fingerprint reader system can take under two
seconds, whereas finding a key ring, locating the right key and using it can
take as long as ten seconds.
Some issues remain jet unresolved. In some cases, if the input sample
quality is not sufficient for further processing, the system must reacquire
data, and the resulting system might be more complicated or more expen-
sive. Furthermore some biometric sensors, particularly those having contact
with users, have a limited lifetime. The most important drawback is that
biometric systems could violate user privacy. Biometric characteristics are
sensitive data containing personal information: for example a DNA sample
contains the user’s susceptibility to disease. A biometric system can imply
loss of anonymity, and users may consider it intrusive or personally invasive.
1.2.5 Traditional vs Strong Authentication Techniques
Different authentication categories may be appropriate for different applica-
tions, depending on perceived user profiles, the need to interface with other
systems or database, environmental conditions, and a host of other application
specific parameters. The attributes of the three categories of user authentica-
tion, described in the previous subsections, are compared in Table 1.2
Table 1.2. Basic user authentication attributes.
Attributes User Authentication
Knowledge Based Token Based ID based
Identification Password, Secret Token Biometric
Supports Secrecy or obscu-
rity
Possession Uniqueness and
personalization
Security Defence Closely kept Closely held Forge resistant
Security Drawback Less secret Lost, stolen Difficult to re-
place
Examples Combinational
lock, password
Metal key, smart
card
Fingerprint, face
The different authentication technologies are compared in detail in [O’G03],
giving a number of some potential attacks against user authentication and rel-
ative defenses by each technique; however, important issue for each of them
can be summarized as follows:
• Knowledge-based: its secrecy and high keyspace defend well against search
and host attacks. Its ability to participate in challenge-response protocols
protects against replay and transmission attacks, with non expensive costs.
The main problem is the difficult to remember passwords for the user.
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This technique does not provide a compromise detection and does not
offer much defense against repudiation.
• Token-based: it can store or generate multiple passcodes (also if combined
with a password). It provides compromise detection and added protection
against denial-of-service attacks. The two main shortcomings are inconve-
nience and cost, and vulnerability to theft. Equipment cost is higher than
a password and comparable to a much secure biometric that requires a
reader. A token with biometric combination has similar security charac-
teristics to a token plus password, however the inconvenience of FRR for
a biometric, defined in 1.2.2, with respect to the inconvenience of remem-
bering a password is matter of user preference.
• Biometrics: one advantage of biometric is that it is less easily lent or stolen
than the other authenticators, so it provides a stronger defense against rep-
utation. The relative simplicity also improve a better security and trust-
worthy authentication process. The stability of such system refers to the
fact that a good biometric maintains its distinctive features over time,
without compromising information. A problem is the limited lifetime for
particular biometrics, but the main drawback is the possible violation of
the user privacy.
An appropriate authentication solution depends upon the particular appli-
cation, each system has its strength and weakness and no a single technique
is expected to effectively meet all requirements of all the applications like
accuracy, security, trustworthy and cost. Although, few combinations of au-
thenticators are recommended, in order to provide secure and trustworthy
authentication systems.
1.3 Architecture of the model
This section introduces an access control model based on a balanced mix of
strong and weak authentication techniques studied to guarantee a high level of
security combining the advantages of each authenticator. The proposed model
describes a trust evaluation process implemented by a system which needs to
be continuously confirmed about the identity of the user who is performing a
certain activity. As an example, we can imagine an on-line degree system which
needs to be sure of the identity of the student who is making an examination,
not only before the test takes place, but also during the test itself, in order
to avoid people replacements after the initial identification process. Fig. 1.1
shows the basic steps of our trust process: after an initial authentication, the
server can require a second or third (or even more) step of authentication
based on two parameters, the level of trust previously computed and the
time passed from the last authentication. We suppose the first authentication
acquired by strong techniques while the following steps can be acquired by
strong or weak techniques on the basis of the trust level we have in a certain
time.
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Fig. 1.1. Context for trust evaluation model
1.3.1 Trustworthiness evaluation parameters
After receiving an initial strong authentication, the server accepts or refuses
the user on the basis of the biometric value (BIO) which has to be higher
than a certain threshold (th) fixed for the application. Indeed, we suppose
that our strong acquisition techniques use an internal fuzzy matching function
between the actual enrollment and the template stored. In case the user is
authenticated, the system receives a fuzzy value (e.g., 0.85) which represents
how the biometric enrollment matches the user’s template. The timeliness
function, which shows how the system’s trust in the identity of the user decays
in time, is shown in equation 1.1 where the value BIOmax represents the initial
value obtained at the initial authentication at time t0 and D is the rate of
decay.
BIO(t) = BIOmax ∗ e
−(t−t0)/D (1.1)
Additionally, the system takes into account another parameter TOK that
represents the boolean output (high/low or authenticated/denied) of the weak
authentication system which supports the evaluation of the trust in the user’s
identity during the activity. At the initial authentication step, the weak tech-
niques are not directly involved, and the parameter TOK is automatically set
to high. Prior to the processing of the inputs, it is necessary to create fuzzy
membership functions which define the degree of membership of each input
parameter in the context of the proposed model. Furthermore, sets of fuzzy
rules, based on linguistic variables, which combine the fuzzy sets, are defined
in order to characterize the output of the model.
After the preprocessing step, the information obtained by the biometric
engine and the parameter TOK are fed into a first fuzzy inference engine Start
in order to calculate a trustworthiness value trust that provides the level of
trust of the system in the user’s identity after the initial authentication at
time t0. The output TRUST is then fed to another engine, Confirmation, that
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checks if the user is active (us(t0) = OK) and in case decides if it is necessary
a new biometric or weak enrollment to enforce the trust of the system before
the user can continue his activity. The enrollments provide new parameters
BIOt0 or TOKt0 that are used by another engine, FinalStepTrust, to compute
the definitive level of trust at time t0. If the level of trust is higher then the
threshold value defined for the application the user is authenticated and can
start to work, otherwise she is refused by the system.
After a certain time interval ∆t, the system checks if the trust acquired
at time t0 has been affected by the decay rate of the initial biometric authen-
tication and then needs to be confirmed. The trust level achieved by the user
at time t0 and the new value of the parameter BIO at time t1 = t0 + ∆t
(BIO(t1)) are now fed to the last fuzzy inference engine TimeTrust, which
decides the trust level at time t1 which can cause the system to refuse the user
or to ask for trust enforcement by going back to the Confirmation engine.
The process, shown in Figure 1.2, stops when the user is not more active
or the trust level decays dramatically to the value of very low.
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Fig. 1.2. Trust Model combining Strong and Weak Authentication Methods and
Fuzzy Systems.
1.4 Trust Model Rules
Each model previously described in Section 1.3, has been implemented with
different fuzzy rules, in order to control the trustworthy value at each time
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step t with respect to different evolved parameters. An example of fuzzy rules,
defined for each implemented model, is reported in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3. Sample Fuzzy Rules defined for each Trust Model.
Model Fuzzy Rules
Start Model IF BIO is high AND TOK is high THEN TRUST is high
IF BIO is medium AND TOK is high THEN TRUST is
medium
...
IF BIO is low AND TOK is low THEN TRUST is very low
Confirmation IF USER is ok AND TRUST is high THEN TRUST is high
Model IF USER is ok AND TRUST is low THEN TRUST is medium
AND New BIO
...
IF USER is ok AND TRUST is medium THEN TRUST is
medium AND New TOK
Final-Step IF New BIO is high THEN TRUST is high
Model IF New TOK is high THEN TRUST is medium
...
IF New BIO is low THEN TRUST is very low
Time-Trust IF BIO is high AND TRUST(t0) is high THEN TRUST(t1)
is high
Model IF BIO is medium AND TRUST(t0) is high THEN
TRUST(t1) is medium
...
IF BIO is low AND TRUST(t0) is medium THEN TRUST(t1)
is low
The Start Model is carried out at first time, giving a trustworthy value
depending on biometric and token/knowledge based acceptance rates, that
have been acquired at the initial user login step.
The trust output is then carried out at each step in the other models, and
it will be checked: if its value is lower than a fixed threshold value, than the
system rejects further user authentication and stops the entire fuzzy model;
otherwise the trust value will become one of the inputs for the further models,
in order to obtain a new trustworthy value at the new step.
The trustworthy value will go into a loop in which timed checks will be
implemented in order to obtain respectively user rights and user status con-
nection.
1.5 Conclusions
In this work we propose a fuzzy logic based methodology based on a balanced
mix of strong and weak authentication techniques studied to guarantee a high
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and prolonged in time level of security combining the advantages of each
authenticator.
In such a scenario, the system, after an initial authentication phase in
which it recognizes the user profile and allows the access, performs some other
authentication steps in which it decides if its trust in user’s identity is enough
high to allow the user to continue to perform the activity she is doing. Focus
of this paper is the description of the fuzzy logic based methodology used to
continuously check and confirm the trust level in the identity of a user.
Future work will include research studies in order to avoid biometric at-
tacks and weak malicious authentication at first access and during the overall
examination time.
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